

FY21 TECHNIQUE PRIORITIZATION REPORT

OCTOBER 21, 2021





Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program, is working with energy sector Asset Owners and Operators (AOO) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop threat detection capabilities for partners to independently identify adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) within their operational technology (OT) environments. An objective of the CYOTE program is to assist AOOs in identifying evidence of anomalous activity within their OT environments through the use of the CyOTE methodology and application of developed capabilities.

The CyOTE methodology applies fundamental concepts of perception and comprehension to the universe of knowns and unknowns, increasingly disaggregated into observables, anomalies, and triggering events. CyOTE capabilities correlate Use Cases developed by industry working group members to individual techniques. The three industry-affirmed Use Cases: Human Machine Interface (HMI), Remote Login, and Alarm Logs, were mapped to the updated (April 2021) MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control System (ICS) Framework.¹

This paper outlines the updated process for the prioritization of techniques identified in the MITRE ATT&CK® for ICS Framework (April 2021) to be addressed by the CyOTE program and supersedes the previous document dated 31 July 2019. The prioritization criteria include:

- Deprecation of detection capabilities previously developed by the CyOTE program
- Identification of techniques used by adversaries in cyberattacks based on the MITRE ATT&CK ICS framework with a focus on frequency of use
- Application of techniques to the three industry Use Cases
- Moving AOO's threat detection capabilities earlier into an attack campaign

The output from the subsequent analysis and refinement has resulted in a list of prioritized techniques for which the CyOTE program will develop capabilities.

2 INTRODUCTION

In 2019, the CyOTE Pilot leveraged a pre-release version of the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework (2019) to analyze adversary TTPs. These previous efforts analyzed the techniques used and applied the three industry Use Cases – HMI, Remote Login, and Alarm Logs – affirmed by the CyOTE Industry Working Group and validated through INL analysis. This analysis evaluated historical cyber case studies where OT log data may have had a high likelihood of containing attack indicators as an adversary traverses OT networks during an attack. Taken together, the three Use Cases identified data sources and fields which covered 87 percent of all techniques described in the ATT&CK for ICS framework.² The CyOTE team mapped the

Use Cases to applicable adversary techniques, identifying available data sources and potential limitations (Figure 1).




Figure 1 Mapping Adversary Techniques to Data Availability

The Industry Working Group Use Case analysis identified three observable types: 1) observables associated to tactics and techniques with implemented collection pathways and validated signatures; 2) observables associated to tactics and techniques with available collection pathways and workable signatures; and 3) observables without known collection tools or techniques. Regarding observables listed within item 2, the CyOTE program noted the existence of numerous commercially available detection capabilities which identify the use of techniques associated with the Initial Access tactic.³ As a result, many of the Initial Access techniques were not considered for development. To identify malicious anomalies earlier in the adversary kill chain^a, CyOTE focused on adversarial use of techniques identified in the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework, which are located left of the Impact tactic. As a result, techniques associated with the Impact tactic were not considered in the prioritization effort. CyOTE used the remaining TTPs, as seen in the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework, to define malicious behaviors or techniques, indicative of a potential attack.

This led to further refinement of the remaining techniques. The analysis identified techniques that an adversary could use in one or more of the Industry Use Cases within OT environments. This analysis resulted in a prioritized list of techniques based upon their applicability to two or more Use Cases as outlined in the prioritization criteria above.

The purpose of this paper is to update the CyOTE program's prioritization of techniques based on updates to the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework.

^a https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html

2.1 MITRE ATT&CK FOR INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) FRAMEWORK (2021)

This paper incorporates changes to the updated MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework from 29 April 2021 (Figure 2). The updated framework is broadly categorized, takes consideration for the heterogeneous nature of ICS/OT network environments and, "... focuses on adversaries who have a primary goal of disrupting an industrial control process, destroying property, or causing temporary or permanent harm or death to humans by attacking industrial control systems."⁴

The updated ICS framework (2021) visually aligns 79 individual techniques, 10 of which align to more than one tactic. MITRE added the Inhibit Response Function and Impact tactics to the framework to reflect adversary goals. This resulted in the identification of 12 applicable tactics for use in characterizing and describing post-compromise adversary behaviors of OT environments. ^{5, 6} Additionally, the current version of the ATT&CK for ICS framework maintains its arrangement of tactics from left to right: the early stages of an attack focus on initial access, execution, and persistence, evading detection, and exploring the environment. The later stages of the attack focus on inhibiting response functions, impairing process controls, and in some cases realizing a physical impact.

Just like in previous iterations of the ATT&CK for ICS framework, techniques are presented in alphabetical order under each tactic in the framework. Definitions for each technique can be found within the framework from MITRE.⁷ The updated MITRE ATT&CK frameworks (2021) have expanded development of their three public frameworks – Enterprise, Mobile, and ICS – to include Cloud.⁸ The Enterprise, Mobile, and Cloud frameworks primarily focus on IT communications. As a result, the techniques associated with those frameworks are presently excluded from current prioritization consideration. The CyOTE program's primary focus is on increasing security for OT environments. As Enterprise, Mobile, and Cloud frameworks become more integrated within OT environments, consideration for expanding prioritization to include the associated techniques will be made.

Each framework identifies tactics and techniques which have been used by adversaries against the various environments.

The updated ATT&CK for ICS framework (Figure 2) better identifies adversary tactics and techniques specifically employed in attacks targeting OT/ICS environments. Example techniques include:

- Native Application Programming Interface (API)
- Remote Services
- Remote Systems Information Discovery

Finally, the April 2021 version of the ATT&CK for ICS framework establishes an updated common taxonomy which combines many similar techniques to increase clarity in highlighting observed and reported TTPs used by adversaries during attacks targeting OT environments. The April 2021 version of the MITRE ATT&CK ICS framework will be used throughout the remainder of the paper as a common lexicon to discuss recent threat activity.




Figure 2 MITRE ATT&CK ICS Framework¹⁰

2.2 DEVELOPED CAPABILITIES

Prioritization of TTPs for analysis and capabilities development was derived from examination of the CyOTE Use Cases and consultations with the CyOTE participating AOOs for validating operational context. This prioritization led to the development of the following capabilities in FY20 and FY21:

- T804 Block Reporting Message
- T806 Brute Force I/O
- T858 Change Operating Mode
- Change Program State*
- T884 Connection Proxy
- Control Device Identification*
- T809 Data Destruction
- T811 Data from Information Repositories
- T812 Default Credentials
- T814 Denial of Service
- T868 Detect Operating Mode
- T816 Device Restart/Shutdown
- I/O Module Discovery*
- T872 Indicator Removal on Host

- T867 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T838 Modify Alarm Settings
- Modify Control Logic*
- T836 Modify Parameter
- T839 Module Firmware
- T861 Point & Tag Identification
- T843 Program Download
- T845 Program Upload
- T873 Project File Infection
- T848 Rogue Master
- T881 Service Stop
- T856 Spoof Reporting Message
- T855 Unauthorized Command Message

Table 1. Developed Capabilities

Note: Items followed by "*" represent capabilities developed prior to the August 29, 2021 update to the MITRE framework which have either been deprecated or merged.

The capabilities listed above currently have Technique Capability Detection sheets that are available to AOOs to improve detection of anomalous activity when implemented within their OT environment. Capabilities developed and shown in Figure 3 are documented and available in the "CyOTE Technique Detection Capabilities Report."^b

^b Contact <u>CyOTE.Program@hq.doe.gov</u> for more information regarding the "CyOTE Technique Detection Capabilities Report."




Figure 3 Developed Capabilities (as of August, 2021)

3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper supersedes the documented analytical framework located in the 2019, "Threat-Informed Tactic, Technique, and Procedure Prioritization Report," used in the prioritization of techniques in FY20. The following analytical framework makes use of cyberattacks outlined in the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework and case studies of adversarial targeting of OT networks to identify frequently used techniques during threat events. The analysis of the techniques employed are then supported through the findings and observation by both Department of Homeland Security incident responders and CyOTE subject matter experts (SME) to identify and remove any potential disqualifiers^c. Further refinements of techniques are accomplished through the application of industry Use Cases (HMI, Remote Login, and Alarm Logs) in which the techniques with the greatest applicability to the three Use Cases receive highest priority. The analytical results generated a list of prioritized techniques which the CyOTE program will use to evaluate future research. The method by which the CyOTE program prioritizes techniques is detailed below in the following schema.

The CyOTE team employs a differential weighting strategy to assign each technique a value between 0-10 based on the following contributing factors:¹¹

- Deprecation of detection capabilities previously developed by the CyOTE program
- Identification of techniques used by adversaries in cyber-attacks based on the MITRE ATT&CK ICS framework with a focus on frequency of use
- Application of techniques to the three industry Use Cases
- Moving AOO's threat detection capabilities earlier into an attack campaign

3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TECHNIQUES USED BY ADVERSARIES IN CYBERATTACKS BASED ON MITRE ATT&CK FOR ICS FRAMEWORK AND USE

The past decade has witnessed a litany of attacks targeting OT environments from Stuxnet in Iran, Industroyer in Ukraine, to Triton in Saudi Arabia. The evolution of these ICS cyberattacks have been documented by the CyOTE team in the 2019 "Threat-Informed Tactic, Technique, and Procedure Prioritization Report." More recently, industry has witnessed a rise in the number of adversaries and attacks specifically targeting industrial control systems across multiple sectors from CryptoLocker and WannaCry, to Ryuk, EKANS, and DarkSide. As a result, cyberattacks against physical equipment is now a globally available action that can be leveraged for commercial, strategic, and financial gains. ¹³

In February 2019, Joseph Slowik wrote of growing threats to ICS based on earlier attacks. Except for Stuxnet, "[ICS cyber] events have progressed from mere enumeration and data gathering (HAVEX campaigns) to active disruption of operations (Ukraine events) to potentially seeking physical destruction (TRISIS)." The report identified increases in adversary sophistication, abilities, and how techniques were employed. This signaled a maturing adversarial approach towards offensive cyber operations.

More recently in 2020 and 2021, adversaries have shifted from immediate process disruption, undermining integrity of physical processes and undermining reliability of underlying process(es), toward the simplification of initial access operations through the use of native system tools and common IT-centric TTPs, "living-off-the-land" instead of using customized malware to gain an initial foothold in an ICS

^d Stuxnet represents an outlier to this trend, as it caused physical damage as early as 2010.

network.¹⁵ This change in strategy allows an adversary to avoid detection in the early phases of their attack by "blending in" with normal user behavior. This increases the chances of adversary actions being overlooked by cyber defenders and operators searching for malicious activity. Increasingly, the introduction of custom malware intended to disrupt ICS processes or cause physical impact is reserved for operations, post compromise.¹⁶

In contrast, the recent events from 2020 and 2021 illustrate the relative success of less sophisticated adversaries and techniques (ex. Ransomware) used in targeting ICS environments, highlighting a relative decrease in adversary sophistication. In its 2020 ICS Threat Landscape Report for H2, cybersecurity firm Kaspersky noted that while ransomware attacks targeting ICS computers dropped globally, the number of attacks targeting ICS computers increased in developed countries (ex. United States +0.25%). ..." these curious dynamics could indicate the response of threat actors to the economic consequences of the pandemic..." Put simply, cybercriminals understand that economically stable organizations (AOOs) in developed countries, like the United States of America, can pay ransom.¹⁷

To identify tactics and techniques historically used by adversaries during cyberattacks targeting ICS, the CyOTE program leveraged events listed by MITRE on their website. Using MITRE's analysis for mapping techniques to adversary actions, the CyOTE team analyzed seven historical events targeting ICS. Further analysis identified 19 malwares and 13 adversary groups that have or are actively targeting ICS. The below example highlights results from a Case Study analyzed and prepared by the CyOTE team.

Note: For scoring relating to specific attacks and techniques used by adversaries to target OT environments, see the scoring spreadsheets located in APPENDIX B

3.1.1 Sunburst Case Study Example Results

3.1.1.1 Overview

In December 2020, FireEye revealed details of a sophisticated threat actor (UNC2452)^e which conducted a supply-chain compromise of a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) associated with a variety of SolarWinds Orion products designed to monitor and manage on-premise and hosted infrastructures.¹⁸ The initial compromise of the supply-chain is assessed to have occurred in March 2020 and facilitated the abuse of legitimate accounts and the deployment of a backdoor called SUNBURST, affecting the U.S. Government, critical infrastructure, industrial organizations, utilities, and private sector organizations.¹⁹ Additional actions allowed the threat actor to bypass multi-factor authentication, compromising Outlook Web Application (OWA), Azure, and M365. Persistence was maintained via the applications of a malicious binary which had a legitimate code signing certificate associated. The attack continues to impact organizations worldwide.^{f20}

3.1.1.2 Techniques Used

T878 Alarm SuppressionT885 Commonly Used PortT812 Default CredentialsT802 Automated CollectionT884 Connection ProxyT816 Device Restart/ShutdownT807 Command Line InterfaceT809 Data DestructionT820 Exploitation for Evasion

^e The U.S. Government attributes this activity to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

^f Additional information is available from the CISA website.



T866 External Remote Services T846 Remote System Discovery T862 Supply Chain Compromise

T872 Indicator Removal on Host T853 Scripting T863 User Execution

T849 Masquerading T869 Standard Application T859 Valid Accounts

T886 Remote Services Layer Protocol

3.1.2 Oldsmar Water Treatment Plant 2021

3.1.2.1 Overview

On February 5, 2021, unidentified cyber actors obtained unauthorized access to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system at the Oldsmar Water Treatment plant located in the U.S. The unidentified event(s) modified the SCADA system's software to increase the amount of sodium hydroxide (lye) used in the water treatment process. According to CISA, "...plant personnel immediately noticed the change in dosing amounts and corrected the issue before the SCADA system's software detected the manipulation and alarmed due to the unauthorized change."²¹

3.1.2.2 Oldsmar Techniques Observed

T822 External Remote Services T836 Modify Parameter

T823 Graphical User Interface T859 Valid Accounts

3.1.3 DarkSide/Colonial 2021

3.1.3.1 Overview

On April 29, 2021 ransomware group Darkside gained access to Colonial Pipeline Company using legitimate credentials for an orphaned virtual private network (VPN) account. This provided attackers remote access to the company's computer network. In the early morning of May 7, 2021, a Colonial employee working in the control room observed a ransom note appear on a computer and reported to the operations supervisor who initiated the shut-down processes of the pipeline. The implications resulted in a loss of fuel across 18 states, negatively impacting countless people and industries on the East Coast of the United States, and the loss of 100 gigabits of data from Colonial networks. Presently, there is no indication that the attackers were able to access the OT network.²²

3.1.3.2 Darkside/Colonial Techniques Observed

T878 Alarm Suppression	T871 Execution through API	T846 Remote System		
T807 Command-Line	T819 Exploit Public Facing	Discovery		
Interface	Application	T888 Remote System		
T885 Commonly Used Port	T866 Exploitation of Remote	Information Discovery		
T884 Connection Proxy	Services	T847 Replication Through		
T809 Data Destruction	T823 Graphical User	Removable Media		
T810 Data Historian	Interface	T853 Scripting		
Compromise	T872 Indicator Removal on	T881 Service Stop		
T811 Data from Information	Host	T856 Spearphishing		
	T827 Loss of Control	Attachment		
T812 Default Credentials	T828 Loss of Productivity and	T869 Standard Application		
T813 Denial of Control	Revenue	Layer Protocol		
	T829 Loss of View	T882 Theft of Operational		
T814 Denial of Service	T849 Masquerading	Information		
T817 Drive-by Compromise	T838 Modify Alarm Settings	T863 User Execution		
T818 Engineering	•	T859 Valid Accounts		
Workstation Compromise	T834 Native API			

3.2 APPLICATION OF TECHNIQUES TO INDUSTRY USE CASES

With regard to the application of Industry Use Cases, prioritization is based upon the applicability of the technique to one or more of the three industry Use Cases – HMI, Remote Login, and Alarm Logs. Increased priority is given to techniques that apply to all three Use Cases and reduced reflective to the application to fewer cases. Figure 4 highlights which of the 79 total techniques can potentially be observed by each of the three industry Use Cases. The results (APPENDIX B, Table 3) are 11 techniques can potentially be observed by all three Use Cases; 41 techniques can potentially be observed by two Use Cases; 16 techniques can potentially be observed by a single Use Case; and 11 techniques cannot be observed by any of the currently identified Industry Use Cases.

Note: The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework contains 89 techniques across 12 Tactics, 10 of the techniques are redundant and found in more than one tactic. This results in a total number of 79 unique techniques.




Figure 4 Application of Techniques to Industry Use Cases

3.3 MOVING AOO'S THREAT DETECTION CAPABILITIES EARLIER INTO AN ATTACK CAMPAIGN

The CyOTE program is focused on providing AOO's capabilities that support their ability to develop threat identification capability to independently identify indicators of attack within their OT networks. In prioritizing the techniques listed in the MITRE ATT&CK ICS Framework the following evaluation criteria was also applied:

- Techniques which have been realized as achieved in FY21 via Technique Detection Capability
 Sheet [27]
- Techniques which do not support the AOO's understanding of OT data to make better risk-informed decisions to secure their OT environments (i.e. the Impact tactic) [12]
- Techniques which do not have dependencies for OT infrastructure components, functions, or systems (Ex. Supply chain compromise) [9]

This analysis resulted in the removal of 45 techniques from current consideration out of a total 79 techniques shown in Figure 5 of the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS framework.




Figure 5 Application of Techniques to CyOTE Program Requirements

4 ANALYSIS

An analysis of the data and constraints identified in Sections 2 and 3 resulted in the creation of an excel document (APPENDIX B) where the CyOTE team calculated weighted scores using the analytic framework referenced in Section 3 to refine the techniques. Then, the CyOTE team applied the techniques to the industry Use Cases in Section 1.1, which identified technique applicability to individual Use Cases and prioritized those techniques based on a decreasing scale. Next, the techniques were applied to the CyOTE program requirements from section 3.3. This enabled the identification of techniques to be removed from current consideration based on the criteria.

Figure 6 shows an overlay of technique prioritization results discussed in this paper. This overlay is designed to highlight commonalities in each of the aspects of the analysis performed. Based on this synthesis, the analysis team recommends the highlighted techniques, as shown in in Figure 6, be considered for future CyOTE analysis. This resulted in the creation of a prioritized list containing 34 techniques for the CyOTE Program*

- Valid Accounts
- Scripting
- Command-Line Interface
- Engineering Workstation Compromise
- Data Historian
 Compromise
- Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- Standard Application Layer Protocol
- Commonly Used Port
- User Execution
- Native API
- Network Connection Enumeration
- Network Sniffing

- Masquerading
- Execution through API
- Remote System Discovery
- Monitor Process
 State
- Block Command Message
- Hooking
- Activate Firmware Update Mode
- I/O Image
- Modify Program
- Rootkit
- Remote System Information
 Discovery

- Automated
 Collection
- Screen Capture
- External Remote Services
- Drive-by Compromise
- Graphical User
 Interface
- System Firmware
- Alarm Suppression
- Manipulate I/O Image
- Block Serial COM
- Man in the Middle
- Exploitation for Evasion

^{*}See APPENDIX B, Table 5 for detailed prioritization information




Figure 6 Final Scoring of Techniques

5 CONCLUSION

From the information contained in Sections 2-3.3 and the resulting analysis in Section 4, the CyOTE program prioritized and identified 34 techniques that would assist AOO's to improve their understanding of OT data to make better risk-informed decisions. This paper supports this endeavor by prioritizing identified techniques used by adversaries during cyberattacks, applying the three industry Use Cases, and evaluating these techniques based on improving the AOO's risk decision making by moving AOO's threat detection capabilities earlier into an attack campaign. Through synthesizing these sources, this paper outlined the process for prioritizing techniques for development consideration supporting ongoing and future CyOTE efforts.

6 APPENDIX A: CYOTE SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT KEY FINDINGS

CyOTE researchers engaged with participating AOOs via interviews and Working Group sessions to identify techniques of industry concern. This process resulted in the following summary of findings:

- IT/OT networks contain similar operating systems and present similar vulnerabilities
- The abuse of native system functionality obfuscates detection requiring increased detection and identification of anomalous observables and technique specific detection capabilities
- Selection is impacted by existing available tools to detect specific techniques in OT environments
- Selection of techniques is dependent upon the availability of resources
- Identification of supply chain compromise of hardware is outside of the CyOTE scope and current capabilities
- Visibility gaps based on AOO criticality and technique correlation is essential to prioritization and selection of capability development efforts
- Identification and monitoring of "choke points" reduces risk and likely vectors of compromise
- Development of common techniques used across attacks increase likelihood of detection
- Focus should be within the borders of the OT environment, between Initial Access and Impact
- Application of detection capabilities in concert with the CyOTE methodology enables faster perception and comprehension of anomalies resulting in more agile risk decisions and risk reduction

7 APPENDIX B

The following are scoring spreadsheets, which are used during the technique prioritization process to 1) identify MITRE ATT&CK for ICS techniques used by adversaries during cyberattacks and the frequency of use; 2) apply techniques to industry Use Cases; 3) apply remaining techniques to current disqualifiers. The resulting output is a list of prioritized techniques for the CyOTE program (Table 5).




Table 2. MITRE-identified techniques used by adversaries during cyberattacks and frequency of use.

Tachnique	Tactics	HIMI Logs X	Pomoto Login Logr	Process Alarm Logs	Total X	TTB Coverage
Technique Activate Firmware Update Mode	Inhibit Response Function	Yes	No	Yes		1 Coverage
Alarm Suppression	Inhibit Response Function	No	No	Yes		1
Automated Collection	Collection Inhibit Response Function	Yes Yes	No No	No Yes		1
Block Command Message Block Reporting Message	Inhibit Response Function	Yes	No	Yes		1
Block Serial COM	Inhibit Response Function	No	No	Yes	1	1
Brute Force I/O	Impair Process Control Execution	No	Yes	Yes		1
	Execution	Yes	No	Yes		1
Change Operating Mode	2443.0.1				2	
Command-Line Interface	Execution	Yes	Yes	Yes		1
Commonly Used Port Connection Proxy	Command and Control Command and Control	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	No No		1
Damage to Property	Impact	No	No	No		0
Data Destruction	Inhibit Response Function	Yes	Yes	No		1
Data Historian Compromise Data from Information Repositories	Initial Access Collection	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes		1
Default Credentials	Lateral Movement	Yes	Yes	Yes		1
Denial of Control	Impact	Yes	No	Yes		1
Denial of Service	Inhibit Response Function Impact	Yes Yes	No No	Yes Yes		1
Denial of View Detect Operating Mode	Collection	Yes	No No	Yes		1
Device Restart/Shutdown	Inhibit Response Function	Yes	Yes	Yes	3	1
Drive-by Compromise	Initial Access	No	No	No		0
Engineering Workstation Compromise Execution through API	Initial Access Execution	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes		1
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Initial Access	No	Yes	No		1
Exploitation for Evasion	Evasion	No	No	No		0
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Privilege Escalation Lateral Movement	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes		1
	Initial Access	NO	res	No		1
Exploitation of Remote Services External Remote Services	Initial Access	No	Yes	No	1	1
Graphical User Interface	Execution	Yes	Yes No	No No		1
	Execution	Yes	Yes	No		1
	Privilege Escalation					
Hooking					2	
I/O Image	Collection	Yes	No	Yes		1
Indicator Removal on Host Internet Accessible Device	Evasion Initial Access	Yes No	Yes Yes	Yes		1
Lateral Tool Transfer	Lateral Movement	Yes	Yes	No	2	1
Loss of Availability	Impact	Yes	Yes	Yes		1
Loss of Control Loss of Productivity and Revenue	Impact Impact	Yes No	Yes No	Yes		1
Loss of Protection	Impact	No	No	No		0
Loss of Safety	Impact	Yes	No	Yes		1
Loss of View Man in the Middle	Impact Collection	Yes No	No No	Yes		1
Manipulate I/O Image	Inhibit Response Function	No	No	Yes		1
Manipulation of Control	Impact	Yes	No	Yes		1
Manipulation of View	Impact	Yes	No	Yes		1
Masquerading Modify Alarm Settings	Evasion Inhibit Response Function	Yes Yes	No No	No Yes		1
Modify Controller Tasking	Execution	Yes	No	Yes	2	1
Modify Parameter	Impair Process Control	Yes	No	Yes		1
Modify Program	Persistence Persistence	Yes No	No No	Yes Yes		1
	Impair Process Control	140	NO	Tes		_
Module Firmware					1	
Monitor Process State	Collection	Yes	No	Yes	2	1
Native API	Execution	Yes	Yes	No		1
Network Connection Enumeration Network Sniffing	Discovery Discovery	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	No No		1
Point & Tag Identification	Collection	Yes	No	Yes		1
Program Download	Lateral Movement				0	0
Program Upload Project File Infection	Collection Persistence	Yes Yes	No	Yes Yes		1
roject ne miection	Lateral Movement	No	Yes	No		1
	Initial Access					
Remote Services					1	
Remote System Discovery	Discovery	No	Yes	No	1	1
Remote System Information Discovery	Discovery	No	Yes	No		1
Replication Through Removable Media Rogue Master	Initial Access Initial Access	Yes Yes	Yes No	No Yes		1
	Evasion	Yes	Yes	No		1
	Inhibit Response Function					
Rootkit					2	
Screen Capture	Collection	Yes	No	No		1
Scripting Service Stop	Execution Inhibit Response Function	Yes Yes	Yes No	No Yes		1
Spearphishing Attachment	Initial Access	No		No		0
	Evasion	Yes	No	Yes		1
	Impair Process Control					
Spoof Reporting Message					2	
Standard Application Layer Protocol	Command and Control	Yes	Yes	No	2	1
Supply Chain Compromise	Initial Access Persistence	No No	No No	No Yes		0
	Inhibit Response Function	NO	No	Yes		1
System Firmware					1	
Theft of Operational Information	Impact	Yes	No	Yes	_	1
Unauthorized Command Message	Impair Process Control	Yes	No	Yes	2	1
User Execution	Execution Persistence	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	No Yes		1
	Lateral Movement	res	res	res		1
Valid Assessment						
Valid Accounts Wireless Compromise	Initial Access	No	No	No	3 0	0
	Discovery	No	No	No		o
	Collection					
Wireless Sniffing					0	
Wireless Sniffing Total					U	86.08%

Table 3. Application of techniques to industry Use Cases.

Block Reporting Message Pixel Force I/O Yes Achieved Change Operating Mode Change Operating Mode Pixel Achieved Connection Proxy Yes Achieved Connection Proxy Data Destruction Pixel Achieved Connection Proxy Data from Information Repositories Pess Achieved Control Proxy Pixel Achieved Connection Proxy Pixel Achieved Control Peter Connection Proxy Pixel Achieved Control Pixel Achieved Connection Proxy Pixel Achieved Control Pixel Achieved Connection Proxy Pixel Achieved Control Pixel Pixel Information Pixel Pixel Pixel Information Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pixel Pix	
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Valid Accounts Table 4. Application of techniques to	

Table 4. Application of techniques to disqualifiers

		0.5	0.5			
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Scripting		7	6	No		Red
Command-Line Interface Engineering Workstation Compromise		2	10 10	No No		Red Red
Data Historian Compromise		1	10	No	_	Yellow
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation		1	10	No	5.5	Yellow
Standard Application Layer Protocol		5	6	No		Yellow
Commonly Used Port User Execution		4	6 6	No No		Yellow Yellow
Native API		3	6	No		Yellow
Network Connection Enumeration		2	6	No		Yellow
Network Sniffing		2	6	No		Yellow
Masquerading		5	3	No		Yellow
Execution through API Remote System Discovery		2 5	6 3	No No		Yellow Yellow
Monitor Process State		1	6	No		Green
Block Command Message		1	6	No		Green
Hooking		1	6	No	3.5	Green
Activate Firmware Update Mode		1	6	No		Green
I/O Image		1 1	6 6	No		Green Green
Modify Program Rootkit		1	6	No No		Green
Remote System Information Discovery		3	3	No		Green
Automated Collection		3	3	No	3	Green
Screen Capture		3	3	No		Green
External Remote Services		3	3	No		Green
Drive-by Compromise Graphical User Interface		5 2	0 3	No No		Green Green
System Firmware		2	3	No		Green
Alarm Suppression		1	3	No		Green
Manipulate I/O Image		1	3	No	2	Green
Block Serial COM		1	3	No		Green
Man in the Middle		2	0	No		Green
Exploitation for Evasion Loss of Protection		1 1	0	No Yes	0.5	Green
Loss of Safety		1	6	Yes	o	
Loss of Control		2	10	Yes	0	
Loss of Availability		1	10	Yes	0	
Theft of Operational Information		4	6	Yes	0	
Loss of View Manipulation of Control		3 1	6 6	Yes Yes	0	
Manipulation of View		1	6	Yes	0	
Denial of Control		1	6	Yes	0	
Denial of View		1	6	Yes	0	
Spearphishing Attachment		9	0	Yes	0	
Loss of Productivity and Revenue		5 4	0	Yes	0	
Exploitation of Remote Services Data from Information Repositories		3	10	Yes Yes	0	
Indicator Removal on Host		3	10	Yes	o	
Service Stop		3	6	Yes	О	
Supply Chain Compromise		3	0	Yes	0	
Data Destruction		3	6	Yes	0	
Denial of Service		3	6 3	Yes Yes	0	
Exploit Public-Facing Application Remote Services		3	3	Yes	0	
Unauthorized Command Message		3	6	Yes	o	
Block Reporting Message		1	6	Yes	0	
Brute Force I/O		1	6	Yes	0	
Change Operating Mode		1	6	Yes	0	
Connection Proxy Default Credentials		2	6 10	Yes Yes	0	
Device Restart/Shutdown		2	10	Yes	0	
Lateral Tool Transfer		2	6	Yes	o	
Modify Controller Tasking		2	6	Yes	0	
Program Download		2	0	Yes	0	
Replication Through Removable Media		2 1	6 0	Yes	0	
Damage to Property Detect Operating Mode		1	6	Yes Yes	0	
Internet Accessible Device		1	3	Yes	0	
Modify Alarm Settings		1	6	Yes	0	
Modify Parameter		1	6	Yes	0	
Point & Tag Identification		1	6	Yes	0	
Project File Infection		1 1	6 6	Yes Yes	0	
Project File Infection Module Firmware		0			0	
Rogue Master		0	6	Yes	0	
Spoof Reporting Message		О	6	Yes	О	
Wireless Compromise		0	0		0	
Wireless Sniffing		0	0	Yes	0	_

Table 5. Prioritized list of Techniques

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